Conspiracy and Time Limits: Massa v Formula One Management Limited

The English High Court (“HC”) handed down an insightful judgment regarding the applicable time limit to bring a conspiracy claim. The case concerned claims made by Felipe Massa (“M”), a former F1 driver, arising out of the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix “crashgate scandal”. The defendants had applied to strike out M’s claim, and for reverse summary judgment, arguing that M’s claims were time-barred. The HC held that some of M’s claims were brought in time (unlawful means conspiracy and inducement of breach of contract), while others were not (breach of contract and tort claims). This article will focus on the former.

The judgment’s reasoning sheds light on the application of section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980 (“Limitation Act”), which extends the time limit to bring a claim when there is deliberate concealment.[1]  Since these proceedings concerned an application for strike out and reserve summary judgment, the HC only had to determine whether M had a real prospect of success that his claims were not time barred. Disputed facts were assumed to be in M’s favour. [2]

Background

In 2008, M was leading the Singapore Grand Prix when another driver deliberately crashed his car to benefit a teammate.[3] Following the crash, M finished the race without points.[4] M claimed that this defeat in Singapore ultimately caused him to lose the 2008 Championship to Sir Lewis Hamilton by a single point.

Unlawful means conspiracy

The crash was investigated in 2009 (the year after the Championship had ended) and sanctions were handed down after the driver admitted wrongdoing.[5] However, M alleged that senior figures within Formula One and the FIA (including Mr Bernie Ecclestone) were aware of / discussed the deliberate nature of the crash and conspired to suppress an investigation before the end of 2008.[6] The investigation report concluded that in late 2008 the FIA did not have sufficient evidence to launch a detailed investigation.

In 2023, a newspaper released an interview with Mr Ecclestone. M argued that before such interview he did not know that the crash was on purpose.[7] M argued that the alleged cover up constituted the tort of unlawful means conspiracy, [8] depriving M of the opportunity to challenge the race result and championship outcome.[9]

Conspiracy is an economic tort that requires an agreement between two or more parties to take a concerted action to cause damage to a target. The tort has two different species, “lawful means” and “unlawful means” conspiracy .The common elements to both are that (1) there must be an agreement or combination between two or more parties; (2) that agreement must be to take action against the claimant; and (3) that concerted action must cause loss or damage to the claimant.[10]

A lawful means conspiracy does not require any unlawful acts. Instead, it requires an intention to harm the claimant. In other words, in a lawful means conspiracy, the predominant interest is to harm someone else as opposed to advancing the person’s own interest.

On the other hand, unlawful means conspiracy requires the use of unlawful means (which could be a crime, a breach of contract, inter alia)[11] in furtherance of an agreement, with the intention to cause injury to a target, but the injury does not necessarily have to be the intended outcome.[12]

Here, M pleaded that the “unlawful means” were the FIA breaching contractual obligations owed to M, or alternatively, to the FIA’s members.[13] The Court accepted the argument in the alternative and recognised that for the present purposes, the “unlawful means” did not, in and of itself, have to constitute an independent cause of action.[14]

Limitation Defence

Section 2 of the Limitation Act provides a general limitation period of six years for actions in tort. This is subject to the exception contained in section 32(1)(b), which applies where “any fact relevant to the plaintiff’s right of action has been deliberately concealed from him by the defendant”.

In circumstances of deliberate concealment, the period of limitation will not begin to run until the plaintiff discovers the concealment (referred to by the HC as the “first heading”) or with reasonable diligence could have discovered it (referred to by the HC as the “second heading”).[15] Under the second heading,  the time starts to run when a reasonable person would be “put on notice” of the need to investigate and it is necessary to consider what a reasonable investigation would have revealed.[16] The time starts to run once the essential facts necessary to complete the cause of action were knowable or inferable. The test is not whether the claim would probably succeed but whether it would survive a strike out or reverse summary judgment.[17]

The defendant applied to strike out M’s entire claim under CPR 3.4(2)(a), and / or for reverse summary judgment under CPR 24.3, contending that the claims were misconceived, and otherwise brought well out of time. The defendants argued that all the facts relevant to M’s claim had been publicly available since September 2009 (when the FIA report was issued),[18] or that at least the relevant facts could have been discovered with reasonable diligence.

In his defence, M argued that he did not have all the information necessary to bring his claim until Mr Ecclestone’s 2023 interview.[19]

As the case came before the Court at summary judgment stage, the HC emphasised that the question was not whether M had ultimately brought himself within the section 32 exception, but whether he had a real prospect of doing so at trial.[20]

No summary dismissal

The Court held that there was nothing in the material available at the time that suggested that the relevant senior figures had conspired – in fact, the material seemed to suggest the opposite.[21] The defendants’ time bar argument therefore hinged upon whether M should have drawn inferences from the 2009 report which could reasonably have led him to the case he now pleaded.[22]

The HC held that M did not have to know all the terms of the conspiracy before time started to run against him; all that was required was that he know the “gist”.[23] This “gist” the Court held, was that the named conspirators had agreed that the revelation that the crash was deliberate would be kept secret to avoid timely investigation.[24]

Overall, the defendants failed to persuade the Court that M did not have a real prospect at trial in demonstrating that, on the inferential basis argued against him, all the essential facts were not in place.[25] This was partly because, considering the 2009 report, a reasonable person would not have possessed a reasonable belief that the crash was not investigated before the end of the 2008 season due to a conspiracy.

Interestingly, the HC noted that given the informal nature of some conspiracies, the availability of relevant documentation will generally be limited, with conspirators being unlikely to have admitted to their conduct.[26]

The Court held that time started to run after Mr Ecclestone interview in 2023. At that point M was able to join the dots by “drawing an irresistible inference”.[27]

Conclusion

M’s claims of unlawful means conspiracy and inducement of breach of contract were allowed to proceed.

Although this summary judgment does not deal extensively with the specific indicia of the tort of conspiracy, the stage is now set for parties to have these arguments at a full trial.

Conspiracy claims can engage section 32 of the Limitation Act. This decision provides an authoritative illustration of the technical elements of the exception, adding to the jurisprudence on this topic. It is a good example of how the inherent secrecy surrounding claims of conspiracy will often make limitation arguments difficult to determine summarily, especially in circumstances where the alleged wrongdoing has been deliberately concealed.

The significance of interviews and public statements, particularly for individuals finding themselves in the public spotlight, is also highlighted. While new public information might not, by itself, prove the existence of conspiracy, it may be enough to provide the “gist” of a cause of action, even if it requires supplementation from other (older) public sources.  This is a helpful reminder that public interviews and commentary may unintentionally reignite historic disputes. Careful thought should always be given to public comments on legal disputes or other controversies, even if they are given years after the event.

[1] Massa v Formula One Management Limited [2025] EWHC 4064 (KB), [153].

[2] Ibid [7].

[3] Ibid [14].

[4] Ibid [15].

[5] Ibid [28].

[6] Ibid [19]-[20].

[7] Ibid [32].

[8] Ibid [38].

[9] Ibid [16].

[10] Kuwait Oil Tanker Co SAK v Al-Bader (No.3) [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 271, [108].

[11] Massa v Formula One Management Limited [2025] EWHC 4064 (KB), [140].

[12] JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov [2018] UKSC 19; [2020] AC 727, [9].

[13] Massa v Formula One Management Limited [2025] EWHC 4064 (KB), [38].

[14] Ibid [140].

[15] Ibid [190].

[16] Ibid [156].

[17] Ibid [191].

[18] Ibid [28].

[19] Ibid [160].

[20] Ibid [154].

[21] Ibid [191].

[22] Ibid [192].

[23] Ibid [194].

[24] Ibid [194].

[25] Ibid [198].

[26] Ibid [201].

[27] Ibid [205].